In Friedman and Samuelson (1990a), we showed that there exist subgame perfect equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the equilibrium strategy combinations are rnntinuous. This paper extends these results by providing a munterpart to the Fudenberg and Maskin folk theorem in rnntinuous strategies. We show that any outmme of the stage game which is feasible and stridly individually rational can be supported as an outmme of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infini[ely repeated game with mntinuous strategies, providing discount fadors are sufficiently high. suggested running head: Continuous Folk Theorem send rnrrespondence to:
In an earlier paper, Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) , the authors showed that there exist subgame perfect equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the equilibrium strategy mmbinations are mntinuous. These equilibria support payoff outrnmes dominating those associated wi[h a single-shot nonmoperative equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium strategies consist of an initial action and a rnntinuous decision rule for choosing actions in later periods.
In Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) we argued that discontinuous dectision tules are sometimes implausible. We do not take the position that they are always less plausible than rnntinuous strategies, but only that some circumstances favor one, some the other. In that spirit, this paper extends our earlier results by providing a munterpart to the Fudenberg and Maskin folk theorem in which decision rules are mntinuous.
[t has long been known that outmmes that Pareto dominate a Nash equilibrium of the stage game can be supported in infinitely repeated games by Nash revetsion trigger strategies.
Let s' denote the action rnmbination called for by an equilibrium strategy mmbination and sà single-shot Nash equilibrium action combination. Under a trigger strategy player i chooses si if no deviation from s-has been enmuntered, but chooses s~after any deviation. The rnntinuous strategies in Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) are analogous to trigger strategy equilibria in two ways: the equilibrium payoffs dominate single-shot Nash payoffs and deviations from equilibrium behavior draw a punishment that dces not depend on which player deviates. The strategies of Friedman and Samuelson differ from trigger strategies in that the latter are dismntinuous, prescribing the same punishment for all deviations from s'.
Im m~trast, the Friedman and Samuelson decision tules prescribe an action near s~in response to a small deviation and prescribe actions which move mntinuously nearer to s~the larger the deviation. These continuous decision tules are akin to the reaction functions of oligopoly theory.
Discontinuous deásion rules also appear in the existing formulations of the folk theorem for repeated games. In the discounted folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) , which is typical of results in the area, equilibrium strategy combinations are mnstructed that (1) will support a given payoff outmme if it dominates the minimax payoffs of the playets (i.e., if it is strictly individually rationa[), (2) are subgame perfect, (3) tailor punishment for defection to the defecting player, and (4) are based on dismntinuous decision rules. 1~e Fudenberg and Maskin equilibria differ from trigger strategy equilibria with respect to (1) and (3), and also differ in requiring significantly more complicated strategies. Much of this complication appears in order to tailor punishments to the identiry of the deviator who has triggered the punishment.
In order to achieve a folk theorem, we will work in this paper with strategies that share features (1) to (3) with the Fudenberg and Maskin strategies. In particular, our s[ra[egies will yield subgame perfect equilibria that support (virtually) any payoff that is strictly individually rational. Our strategies will also tailor punishmenu to the identity of the deviator who triggets the punishment. This tailoring of the punishment to the defector appears crucial to supporting arbitrary individually rational outcomes. However, our to Fudenberg and Maskin, if~o -0 and~, -1 for some player i, then player i is being held to his minimax payoff. As with our earlier fotmulation, if~o~1 and players foUow their equilibrium strategies, then~o will rise over time, mnverging to~o -1 in the limit.
We thus work with a reference point that mmbines features found in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) . This allows us to combine charaderistics of the Fudenberg and Maskin strategies, suppotting individually rational payoffs, with characteristics of the Friedman and Samuelson strategies, yielding equilibria in mntinuous strategies. The result is an extension of the follc theorem to subgame perfect continuous strategies.
The sense in which our equilibrium strategies are rnntinuous deserves attention. In Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) the decision tule of a player i selected the period t action (s") as a mntinuous function of either the action mmbination of the previous period (s,.,) or the action mmbination and the reference point (s,.,,~,.,). The equilibrium mnttudion is illustrated in the payoff space shown in Figure 1 . Equilibrium behavior called for selecting s' at t-0(for a payoff of P(s')) and at later times, given that no defections had ocxurred.
(place Figure 1 about here)
Defections then called for equilibrium choices, parameterized by~, on the line connecting single shot Nash payoffs P(s~and P(s'). The smaller the defection the nearer the indicated point would be to P(s~.
Not all games permit such decision rules, as Figure 2 illustrates. The resulu of (place Figure 2 about here) Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) require that the rnnnecting path from P(s~to P(s~must be upward sloping (though it need not be linear). The points P(s~and either C or A in Figure 2 cannot be rnnnected by an upward sloping path mntained in the set of feasible payoffs. We have been unable to develop general conditions under which such a connecting path can be rnnstructed. We propose two routes around the problem.' One route, followed in Friedman and Samuelson (1990b) , is to investigate particular classes of games, such as duopolies, in which the problem can be shown to be absent. The other mute, followed below, is to adopt the standard mnvention of allowing the players to choose rnrrelated mixed actions (cf. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) ). in terms of Figure 1 , this would give~, the role of a probabiliry distribution. When following their equilibrium decision rvles, the players would choose a mrrelated mixed action placing probabiliry~, on s' and 1-~, on s`. This paper uses rnrrelated mixtures to develop a class of equilibria which is more general than the type illustrated in Figure 1 and under whicb virtually any individually rational single shot payoff vector can be supported.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The model is described in Section 2. The main theorem, in which the playen are allowed to choose mrrelated mixed actions, is presented in Section 3. Section 4 examines cases in which the folk theorem can be achieved without correlated mixed actions. Conduding mmments are in Section 5.
The Model

The Single-Shot Game
The single-shot game is characterized by (N, S, P), where N-{1,..., n} is the set of players, S, is the single-period pure strategy space of player i ( the set of actions available to player i in any period), S-X;ENS; is the single-period pure action space, Pi is the single-period payoff function of player i, and P -(P,,..., P~. A pure action combination for the players in N`{i}, the n-1 players other than player i, is denoted s,,,`~,}. The mrresponding action space is denoted SM,,, -x}E,,,`{,~5~. We make the following rnmmon assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 2 S; c Rm is mmpact and mnvex, i E N.
ASSUMPTION 3 P; is scalar valued and continuous on S, i E N.
We do not make the usual quasiconcavity assumption, which is used to ensure the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in the single-shot game, because this equilibrium plays no role in our analysis. The critical punishment payoffs are minimax rather than equilibrium payoffs.
The Infinitely Repeated Game
The infinitely repeated game can now be formally expressed. Although the equilibrium we examine has a stationary character, the players can use a succession of different dedsion rules over time and strategy spaces must be formulated to take this into acrnunt. In particular, for t? 1, player i can use any rule from the set V" -{v;,~v;,:S' yS;}. As we assume perfect monitoring (i.e., that each player knows at time t the actions taken by all players in the past), the history of the game at time t, h, -(so,..., s,.,) E S`, is known to each player who is then free to select any decision tvle from V,,. A typical strategy in the repeated game is then
note that a strategy rnmbination, o E~" induces a specific path of action rnmbinadons: u(o)
Letting a-(a,,..., a") E (0, 1)" be the players' dismunt parameters, the repeated game payoff functions are
Letting G-(G,,..., G"), the game is then given by (N,~" G).
Minimax Payoffs
The minimax payoff of player i is defined as min,M~i~E~~ymax,iE~P,(s,,,`~,},s,).' Let s' be the action combination that minimaxes player i, so that v; -P;(s') and v-(v,,..., v"). Let ,..., y;.,, v;, y;,,,. ..,yÁ) -y', so that P(s~) is the vedor of payoffs when player i is minimaxed. Note that we do not know, in general, how a given y; (the payoff player i receives when player j is being minimaxed) is related to v;. When minimaxing player j, player i could receive a payoff either higher or lower than v;.
Reference Points
Let A" -{x E R;~F~,ay -1} be the unit simplex in R". The reference point is then 3. The Continuous, Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem
Strateges
Because each value of the reference point designates a correlated mixed action and has an associated expected payoff vector, specifying strategies is accomplished by specifying how the reference point is determined. We begin by letting the initial value of the reference point be given by~o -(1, l~n,..., l~n). Then the transition of~, into~,t, can be specified. If no defection took place at time t, then~" through ;8~, are unchanged, meaning that the defector status of the players is unchanged. (I. e.,~,,,t, -~;, for i E N.) If~a~1, then~o ,t" -W~a t 1-p for W E(0,1), which is nearer to one. If there was defection in period t, then~;,,, ?
;, for the defectors; while, for the nondefectors,~;,a, 5~,,. As long as~n~0 for some nondefedors, strict inequality will hold for such nondefectors and for all defedors.
Furthermore, the~; of the nondefectors will be reduced in equal proportions. ALso,~o.,,, will be smaller than it would have been in the absence of a defection.
To see the preceding in detail, let Po ( 
P.(c(~,)~") -P;(c(~,)) zi, -m~{ pqc(~,)) -R,(c(~,))~O~( 2)
Note that z" is normalized to measure extra payoff as a fraction of the largest possible extra deviation payoff that the player rnuld have and, if s;, reduces the payoff of player i, the extra deviation payoff is taken to be zero. Let zo -~,z;,, zM -max{l, zo} z; -min{1, zo1.
Eqs. (3) and (4) below give the transition from~, to~,,,.
;.,., -(1 -z;)~;, t z"~z,". i E N
o.~.i -max{0, W~a -zo f 1-W} (4) Eq. (3) has the desiced proper[ies that (1) a player's defector status must be nonnegative, (2) the sum over players is one, and (3) if one or more players defect when the defectors' rnmbined defector statuses are less than one, then their mmbined defector status rises while that of each nondefector falls to a fraction of its previous value. Eq. (4) assures that the level of cooperation is between zero and one and that, following defection, the level of cooperation is lower than it would have been in the absence of defection. When there is exactly one dcfector, then equations (3) and (4) (.))) and the equilibrium strategy rnmbination is denoted ó.
Equilibrium
These strategies provide a mntinuous folk theorem: 
w -~ivi t~xi~iPi(~) -áivi (1 -QaY
x -x; t ( 1 -~,)e,
Thus for fixed Sp j E N, w is the expected (one period) payoff to player i at~o -0 and x is his expected payoff at~o -1. Using the expression for y, w-~,v, f(1 -~;)y. Following the small deviation by player i of size z,~; rises and the other~i (j~0, i) fall. The respective counterparts of w and x, after~changes due to the deviation, are~and x'. The payoff for player i with z-0(i.e., if he followed the equilibrium prescription and did not deviate) is
and the maximum payoff player i rnuld receive as a result of deviating is
1 -a; 1-a;p J 1-a;p
The following inequality expresses the mndition that eq. (6) exceeds eq. (7) (i.e., deviation payoff is less than nondeviation payoff):
1-a;p ll-a; 1-a;p
To show conditions under which eq. (8) (9) and (10) holding; therefore, eqs. (9) and (10) ii~iviy ey. (ó). 
II; -P;(c(io)) -(1 -
The left side of eq. (9) is bounded while the right side gces to infinity as (a;, p) goes to (1, 1); therefore, there is a set of values of (a;, p) E(0, 1)~for which eq. (9) holds. In addition, if eq. (9) holds for (a;, p) E(0, 1)2 and (a;, W') E(0, 1)2 satisfies (a" W7 Z(a;, p), To see how the game proceeds, suppose that S, -1 and~z -0, so that player 1 is the defector. Then, depending on the value of~o the players will randomiae between w' and s', with the expected payoff lying on the edge going from P(s') to P(~'). If Sa -1, then "full l'UUPCI31llUll' IJ IIÍ Cllel'l,~1VCIl t11C LCIaUVC UCÍeI'LUr JUftW Ul lÍle playelJ, allU play wiii proceed at w' for payofffs of P(w'). If~o -0 the players will receive payoffs of P(s') and if they continue [o play with no defections, the expected payoff will proceed on the straight line to P(rv').
Now suppose S, -y3 and~, -'I3. The expected payoff would then be somewhere on the broken line in Figure 4 running from A to B. The closer is~o to unity, the closer will the expected payoffs to A.
Next consider Figure 5 . Here, the actions required to minimax player 1 provide player 2 with a higher payoff than player 2 receives at c,~~. To see the potential difficulties which then arise, suppose that~, -1 and that the players are currently randomizing between~'
and s' so as to give an expected payoff at A. If player 2 should defed, then~" decreases, signaling a reduced degree of cooperation and~2increases, signaling an increase in player 2's defedor status. It is possible that the net effect of these two changes is to move the game to a point such as B, wi[h 2's payoff rising. It is thus possible for~" [o fall and~2 [o rise, as shown, with the ensuing payoff to player 2 still going up in the "punishment" phase as a mnsequence of his defection. It is obvious that such a"punishment" will not deter player 2 from deviating. To rnnstitute an equilibrium, the strategies must be devised so that the payoff to a defector falls after any defection. In Figure 5 , this must be accomplished by ensuring that, in the event of a deviation by player 2,~, rises suffiriently rapidly relative to the fall iñ a. Much of the proof of Theorem 1 is mncerned with establishing this property.
Uncorrelated Strategies
The strategies used in the proof of Theorem 1 are constructed with the help of [he assumption that players can rnrrelate their mixed strategies. In some games, this may not be required.
Fix an outcome x' and fix e. Recalling the definitions of m' and s`in (2.4), let
H(x', e) is thus the set of payoff vectors that rnuld be chosen by the strategy mmbinations given in (5). Let H~E R"" be the set of n t 1 tuples, (x',e), such that x'~~v and such that there is a mnnected subset of S, denoted S(x', e), that P maps one-to-one onio H(x', e).
Hence, if (x', e) E H~, then every payoff in H(x', E) can be achieved by a pure stra[egy in LEMMA 2 Let ( x`, e) E H~and, for~E Y, let x(~) E S(x`, e) be defined by eq. (11). Then x is defined, single-valued, and rnntinuous.
PROOF By construdion, for each~E Y there is a unique s E S(x', e) that satisfies eq. (11) The statement of the folk theorem extension is now:
THEOREM 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, and given~o E Y, if (x;, e) E H~, then there exist values of (a, W) E(0, 1)"" such that ó is a rnntinuous subgame perfed equilibrium strategy combination for the repeated game.
z3
To prove Theorem 2, replace the definition of z;, given in eq. (2) 
5.
Concluding Cotnments 7heorems 1 and 2 present variant versions of the Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) extension of the folk [heorem for repeated games. Similar to Fudenberg and Maskin, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria that support virtually any individually rational payoff vector of the single shot game. Our equilibria differ in two key ways. First, the supported points (x; f(1 -i~n)e, ..., x~t(1 -t~n)e) may not include points on the payoff frontier, although they can get arbitrarily close. Semnd, the equilibrium strategies utilize mntinuous decision rvles. 
